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1 Introduction
In classical democratic theory, the justification for
accountability related almost exclusively to elected
representatives. In contemporary governance
thinking, by contrast, the objects of accountability
initiatives quite centrally, if not primarily, include
non-elected public bureaucracies. This is not
particularly surprising given the blurring, in recent
times, of the line between the political and the
administrative. The enlargement of bureaucracies and
the often collaborative nature of their relationship
with the political executive have made it difficult to
attribute particular actions to either.
The conceptual moorings of the idea of
accountability are to be found in two affinal
traditions: first, the old public administration
literature and its more recent avatar, the new public
management; and second, the governance paradigm
in which it appears, in a grander claim, as the magic
formula to resolve most if not all problems of the
public sector. However, in the neo-liberal context of
complex relationships between public agencies,
citizens re-designated as consumers or users, and the
not necessarily public producers and/or providers of
services, neither of these ideological frameworks
provides a satisfactory account of the markers of
accountability in general, or of how its adequacy or
otherwise in particular areas such as service delivery
may be benchmarked.
It is useful to consider how the study, ‘Modes of
Service Delivery, Collective Action and Social
Accountability’, that has produced the articles in this
IDS Bulletin, is attempting to address these crucially
important questions.
2 Accountability: an undistinguished conceptual
history and a legacy of unanswered questions
Outside of the realm of democratic theory,
academic discourse on accountability has
conventionally belonged to the discipline of Public
Administration, in which it acquired a meaning
extending the early financial connotations of the
term. Largely preoccupied with internal modes of
accountability – such as channels of authority,
control, reporting and performance evaluation – the
external forms of accountability recognised in this
perspective, were confined to what subsequently
came to be called horizontal accountability, through
institutions such as the ombudsman or judicial
review, although occasionally also including media
scrutiny and pressure group activity (Smith 1991).
More recently, accountability concerns have been
imported into the New Public Management (NPM)
literature, as part of the debate on public sector
reform.1 And, of course, in contemporary governance
discourse, accountability is found linked to almost
every conceivable aspect of ‘good governance’ –
from developmental effectiveness to empowerment.
It is brandished as the complete and final solution to
all governance problems – the chief instrument for
combating the ‘three-headed monster’ of
corruption, clientelism and capture (Ackerman 2005).
The World Bank’s emphasis on social accountability is
also essentially from a ‘how to’ perspective of
arriving at generalisable solutions to the problem of
accountability.
Mainstream political science literature on the state and
society provides two important distinctions: first, that
between answerability, or ‘the obligation of public
officials to inform about and to explain what they are
doing’ and enforcement, or ‘the capacity of accounting
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agencies to impose sanctions on power holders who
have violated their public duties’ (Schedler 1999: 14);
and second, that between vertical (elections and other
mechanisms by which citizens control governments)
and horizontal (the checks and balances in
governmental systems designed to ensure that due
process is followed in governmental decision making)
accountability (O’Donnell 1999). While vertical
accountability refers to the relationship between the
citizen and the state, horizontal accountability is
broadly internal to the state structure itself.
The new attention to non-state actors – and in
particular civil society interventions – has quite rightly
qualified the rigid distinction between vertical and
horizontal forms of accountability. As Smulovitz and
Peruzzotti (2000) have suggested, civil society groups
represent new forms of accountability claims, neither
vertical nor horizontal, because the agents are
neither citizens (using vertical mechanisms such as
voting and elections) nor other organs of the state
(providing checks and balances). The mode of societal
accountability sponsored by civil society
organisations, social movements and media, often in
collaboration with each other, uses voice rather than
the vote. It remains vertical but – unlike individual
citizens – it does not need to wait for elections to be
announced; it can be catalysed ‘on demand’ as and
when the situation requires such mobilisation; and it
can be directed towards single issues, policies or
functionaries. Civil society initiatives can also
occasionally generate hybrid forms of accountability
that bridge the horizontal–vertical divide when,
though directly aimed at achieving vertical
accountability, they additionally cause intra-state
horizontal accountability mechanisms to be
energised, thus creating conditions for greater
accountability than may have been possible purely
through the vertical route (Goetz and Jenkins 2001).
The broad picture that emerges from the not
particularly voluminous literature on the subject
suggests that the actors seeking accountability, as also
those from whom accountability is sought, have
multiplied. Those seeking accountability now include
not only individual citizens but also civil society groups,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social
movements. Accountability, moreover, appears to be a
cause adopted by very dissimilar groups – from NGOs
broadly sympathetic to neo-liberalism to the social
movements which strongly oppose it. Both, Baviskar
(2006) tells us, are equally ardent campaigners for
accountability, though we do not exactly know the
practical implications of this difference. Does, for
instance, the demands for accountability lose its radical
edge if it attracts ideologically diverse, indeed sharply
opposed, sponsors?
As for those to whom demands of accountability are
addressed, their number too has grown and is
extremely diverse. They include not just state
agencies, but also corporations and civil society
organisations. Despite its self-righteousness in the
watchdog role, it has assumed in holding the state to
account, how accountable is civil society itself? If
NGOs do their funders’ bidding, and their
accountability is to the funding agencies alone, can
they really be described as ‘civil society’? Service-
delivery NGOs, in particular, often function as state
franchises and public-service contractors, as well as
implementers of state-designed and state-funded
development programmes where states themselves
lack the capacity to implement. In the performance
of these roles, the NGO necessarily becomes
accountable to the state. Indeed, some of the
accountability talk emanating from civil society can
be deeply depoliticising, insofar as it pits (virtuous)
civil society against (evil) politics, and superciliously
positions civil society as a ‘clean’ alternative to the
‘dirty’ business of politics.
An aspect of the accountability question that
remains under-investigated is that of the instruments
of accountability. In India, the Right to Information
Act 2005 represents one such instrument. As a
mechanism to bring about greater transparency, this
is a legislation that can at best facilitate mobilisation
and action for accountability. However, there is often
a tendency to use the terms accountability and
transparency interchangeably, which hints at a
conceptual confusion, but one that has practical
consequences: an initiative that is effective in
securing transparency is assumed to substitute for
accountability, as the instrument becomes the goal. It
tends also to obscure the next steps in the process,
of what to do with such information as is gleaned
through the Right to Information Act to take it
forward to grievance redressal. The state machinery
for the redressal of public grievances is far from
perfect, but it tends not to receive the attention it
deserves if the transparency gains are to translate
into accountability benefits. What are the chief
instruments of accountability; how are they related
to each other as to the larger objective of achieving
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accountable governance; which instrument is likely to
be most effective, and in which context? We do not
yet have sufficient clarity on these issues.
3 Modes of service delivery, collective action and
social accountability
‘Modes of Service Delivery, Collective Action and
Social Accountability’ is an ambitious study that seeks
to compare three large metropolitan cities – Mexico
City, São Paulo and Delhi – in as many countries of
the South. The project is not confined to looking
simply at how forms of collective action result in
improved service delivery. Instead, through a focus on
two areas – health and social assistance – it seeks to
understand how particular types of reform in service
delivery are enabling of collective action; how
collective action intervenes not only in the delivery
mechanism but also at the stage of influencing policy
formulation; and, most importantly, how social
accountability is enhanced through such
interventions. The hypothesis is that reforms that are
‘voice-oriented’ (e.g. that enable decentralisation and
institutionalise participation) and allow scope for
collective actors to participate in the negotiation of
policies, as opposed to those that are ‘choice-
oriented’ (e.g. market mechanisms), are more likely
to increase access to and quality of services, as also
societal accountability of the service providers. Social
accountability is in turn defined as the
institutionalisation of ‘durable societal controls over
policies, including over their implementation or
uptake by providers’ (see Joshi, this IDS Bulletin), and
therefore focuses on more than merely community
mobilisation for securing public benefits.
3.1 Is accountability more than an outcome?
The study conceptualises accountability in terms of
(a) the social, i.e. collective, dimension of
accountability, in opposition to individual
accountability; and (b) the instruments used by these
actors – such as monitoring, exposing wrongdoing,
etc. The literature emanating from the World Bank
defines social accountability in ways that largely
cohere with this research, as a form of accountability
that relies on civic engagement, encompassing
actions by citizens, communities, the media and
NGOs. But that literature further distinguishes
between types of social accountability based on the
actors involved; the collaborative or conflictual mode
of such action; the incentive structures based variously
on punishment and reward; the depth of involvement
of civil society from the planning stage onwards; and
the purpose of accountability in terms of adherence
to rules or performance. Whether or not the
research frame of this project subscribes to any of
those assumptions is not known, but it is worth
asking whether this framework yield an alternative,
and more robust, theorisation of accountability,
instead of viewing it only as an outcome, albeit an
institutionalised one, of collective action?
3.2 Is accountability to be inferred or
independently measured?
Following from this, there is arguably room for
greater clarity about whether social accountability is
to be inferred from the impact of collective action on
service providers, or whether it is a variable to be
independently measured. While a great deal of
careful thought has gone into the methodological
aspects (see Houtzager and Acharya, this IDS
Bulletin), little is said about how social accountability
will be identified and measured. In the discussion of
the third analytic level – the level of cross-sectional
analysis of the health and social assistance catchment
areas in low-income neighbourhoods – actual
improvements in policy implementation and service
outputs are rightly taken as measures of improved
service delivery. However, it remains unclear
whether the concept of social accountability is
merely implicit in these improved outputs or has an
independent analytical status, and if so how it will be
measured. This becomes especially important in view
of the explicit elaboration of accountability in terms
of institutionalised and durable controls over both
policy and its implementation, and the equally
explicit reluctance to view it as particular public
benefits extracted by community mobilisation.
3.3 Diverse impacts of collective action: policy
shifts and/or improved service delivery?
There are at least three types of possibilities
exemplified by the health and social assistance cases
in the study. These are: low levels of collective action;
impact of collective action in terms of effecting
policy shifts rather than improved service delivery;
and impact of collective action on improved service
delivery. The Mexican cases appears to illustrate the
first, as we are told that participation by citizens –
whether as users of services or as lacking access to
them – is weak, and such measures of social
protection as have been initiated are the result of
the perception of bureaucrats and academics that
the health system has under-performed (see Gómez-
Jauregui, this IDS Bulletin).
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Second, the impact of collective action may, as in the
case of Brazil, be manifest in policy shifts rather than
in an improved quality of service delivery. The
emphasis on collective action as participation in the
negotiation of the content of public sector reform
and policy is unusual and important. Nevertheless,
there is no analytical explanation for why policy shifts
alone – rather than in combination with actual
improved delivery or access – should fully satisfy the
test of social accountability.
Probably the most interesting case for the research
question is the use of a new national law, the Right
to Information Act 2005, by the NGO Parivartan to
expose corruption and bring about greater
transparency in the Public Distribution System (PDS)
in Delhi (see Pande, this IDS Bulletin). However, even
this article does not signal whether this has actually
reduced corruption in the PDS or improved access,
or even whether an appeal has been made to the
appellate agency or if that agency has acted to
punish those responsible. This part of the story is
simply missing in what is arguably the ‘best’ case for
the study.
A recent study, ‘Democracy and Well-Being in India’
(Chandhoke 2005), suggested that while a political
and governmental commitment to welfarism, and an
active civil society are crucially important, civil society
mobilisation by itself is often ineffectual without
judicial activism. The public interest litigation on the
Right to Food in India (Pande, this IDS Bulletin) bears
this out. Given the interest in institutions (e.g. in how
institutions influence collective action) in this study, it
would be useful to differentiate, and theorise these
differences, between the institutions to which
collective action is addressed.
3.4 Effective service delivery without
accountability?
A set of recent studies on India have documented
successful experiments in making service delivery
effective without collective action playing a role, and
without necessarily enhancing social accountability
(Chand 2006). A variety of factors – political and
institutional – have contributed to these successes,
not all of which are or have been sustainable in the
longer term. The ‘Modes of Service Delivery,
Collective Action and Social Accountability’ study
does in fact mention the role of political party
competition in both national and local-level reforms,
and the Brazil cases pay some attention to the
political dynamics of these (see Dowbor and
Houtzager, this IDS Bulletin). Nevertheless, there is a
strong case for considering ‘deviant’ cases of
effective service delivery, facilitated by the top-down
mobilisation of political support (Houtzager, this IDS
Bulletin). A comparison between human
development performance in the Indian states of
Tamil Nadu and Karnataka documents quite
convincingly the role of institutionalised welfarism in
Tamil Nadu, where political competition and
alternation of power between the two major parties
has ensured that the welfare gains of one regime are
not overturned by another (Goyal 2006: 320).
Normatively, of course, effective and responsive
service delivery is to be preferred in combination
with stable patterns of social accountability. But it is
hard to disregard examples of political commitment
and administrative competence, without much civil
society activism, providing efficient public services.
3.5 Civil society: service provider and watchdog?
The role of civil society organisations in service delivery
raises an important question: how do we think about
social accountability in situations where civil society
organisations are themselves the service providers? In
most of the cases selected for study, the reforms have
implied privatisation. It is only in Brazil (in the area of
health) that the research includes a case representing
the broader process of ‘pluralisation’ with non-profit
organisations also participating in service delivery. This
may introduce a bias into the research, for in India –
though not in the cases selected for research – the
involvement of NGOs in service provision is fairly
common. The exclusion of such cases, by implication,
excludes therefore the critical question of what
happens to accountability when civil society
organisations themselves become the producers or
providers of services?
3.6 Instruments of accountability
A striking case in the research is that of the use of the
Right to Information Act by the NGO Parivartan in
exposing the corruption and misappropriation of
subsidised food meant for the poor from the PDS in
Delhi. In sharp contrast to this success in using the
Right to Information Act (RTI) as an instrument of
accountability in Delhi, there is the case of the PDS in
Tamil Nadu, whose almost model efficiency is a result
of political commitment and administrative
competence. Though the RTI in that state makes a
specific reference to the PDS, NGOs in Tamil Nadu
have not needed to step into this arena, possibly
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because ‘electoral outcomes are determined on the
floor of the fair price shops’ (Venkatsubramanian
2006: 287). There are scores of other successful
instruments – including citizens’ report cards – and this
research could make an important contribution by
simultaneously and separately documenting the
varieties of instruments of social accountability
uncovered in the various case studies. Smulovitz and
Peruzzotti, among others, have mentioned the role of
the media, and it definitely played a role in Parivartan’s
campaign against the PDS. Other empirical studies
may possibly provide more evidence of this.
3.7 Multi-level accountability?
The study discussed in this IDS Bulletin is sensitive to
the possibly distinct dynamics of national-level and
local-level policies, and this is arguably an issue also
worth thinking about in relation to accountability.
Much activism for accountability takes place at the
local level, and sometimes around a single issue, and
it is not always clear if these initiatives remain
confined to the local, and under what conditions
they can be replicated and scaled-up. What is needed
is a perspective that can relate these levels to each
other and situate them within a broader analytical
framework.
4 Theorising accountability
It is clear that accountability has, in recent years,
moved from being the supply side of a right, closer
to being articulated as a right in itself. Though, as we
have already noted, the RTI is frequently and
mistakenly assumed to stand in for accountability
itself, it is obvious that information is only an
instrument towards the larger objective of securing
accountable governance. It is possible that the
coming years will see accountability projected as a
citizens’ right in itself, even if as a ‘manifesto’ right
(O’Neill 1986), rather than one that can be enshrined
as such in law.
The same reasons that make it impossible for
accountability to be enshrined as a legal right also
indicate why the principle of accountability is
frequently an emanation from social practice rather
than from theory. Though implicit in the very
fundamentals of democratic theory, it is hard to
design outside of institutional structures. The
advancement of this goal is the task of social and
political action, rather than of theory itself. Political
scientists can, of course, reflect on the comparative
experiences of such practices in various countries of
the world; they can try and explain why certain types
of accountability initiatives are more effective and in
which contexts; and they can also indicate policy
instruments that could enhance accountability.
Ultimately, however, accountability is something that
citizens seek and achieve from governments that are
willing to be accomplices in the broader objectives of
the democratic project.
Following from this, finally, it is evident that while
the emphasis on civil society activism rightly draws
our attention to the necessarily social (as opposed to
individual) character of accountability initiatives, it is
important not to forget that state agencies and state
personnel, which are the targets of these initiatives,
have also, willingly or otherwise, to be a participant
in these – whether by their role in the passage of
laws such as the Right to Information and the
drafting of Citizens’ Charters or by their occasionally
reluctant capitulation to these.
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Notes
1 In some quarters of NPM, of course, there is
resistance to this on the grounds that the
inordinate assigning of blame on public
functionaries is ‘dysfunctional’ because it
emphasises the negative aspects of accountability
and will therefore encourage ‘more buckpassing
and scapegoating by both politicians and
appointed officials’ (Thomas 1998: 353).
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